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THE BAPCPA, THE GAG RULE, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT:  A PROPOSAL FOR ALIGNMENT THROUGH
INTERPRETIVE AND ANALYTICAL CHANGE
Cullen Ann Drescher*
On October 17, 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act1 (the “BAPCPA” or the “Act”) took effect as the product of nearly a decade of
congressional debate about proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, and
“represents one of the most comprehensive overhauls of the Bankruptcy Code in
more than twenty-five years.”2  The stated purpose of the BAPCPA was to “improve
bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the
bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”3
Although the declared intent behind the BAPCPA is hardly objectionable as a legis-
lative goal, the substance of the Act has come under intense scrutiny even before its
passage into law.4
One of the BAPCPA’s most controversial provisions is embodied in section
526(a)(4) of the Act (the “Gag Rule”).5  That provision explicitly prohibits attorneys
from advising debtors who are contemplating bankruptcy to take on additional debt,
even when providing such counsel would be both prudent and perfectly legal.6  A
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2009; B.A., Georgetown University. I would like
to thank my mentor, Douglas M. Foley, Esq., for his insight and editorial contributions to the
creation of this Note.
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 526–528 (2006).
2 Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 485 (2005).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
4 See Jensen, supra note 2, at 485 (“[T]he enactment of BAPCPA in 2005 brought to a
close a tumultuous legislative reform initiative that—over the course of a decade—became a
poster child illustrating some of the most creative examples of legislative legerdemain.”).
5 Section 526(a)(4) provides that “[a] debt relief agency shall not . . . advise an assisted
person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing
a case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for
services performed as part of preparing for or representing a debtor . . . under this title.” 11
U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
6 See id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 578–79 (2005)
(explaining liability on attorneys may be imposed although “there may be instances where
it is advisable for a client to obtain a mortgage, to refinance an existing mortgage to obtain
a lower interest rate, or to buy a new car on time”); Debra H. Devan, Attorneys’ Ethical
Obligation Clash with Recent Amendments to Bankruptcy Code, MD. B.J., May–June 2007,
at 4, 8 (“Many times taking on more debt is the most financially prudent option for a pro-
spective bankruptcy debtor.”).
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violator of this provision may be obligated to return “any fees or charges” paid
to him or her by the debtor-client along with any “actual damages” and “reasonable
attorneys’ fees.”7
In passing section 526(a)(4), Congress sought to accomplish two related objec-
tives.8  First, Congress sought to prevent debt relief agencies from advising clients
about how to discharge additional debt, thereby diluting the amount that creditors
would otherwise receive in a bankruptcy payout.9  Second, Congress intended to pre-
clude a putative debtor’s “gaming” of the means test.10  The means test was also intro-
duced as part of BAPCPA as a tool by which to determine whether a debtor qualifies
for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7.11  The latter concern reflects the possi-
bility a debtor may worsen the appearance of his or her financial situation by incurring
additional debt, thereby increasing the likelihood that protection under Chapter 7 will
be available.12
Part I of this Note explores the constitutionality of section 526(a)(4) of the
BAPCPA under the First Amendment, including a discussion of recent cases in which
courts have struggled to determine whether section 526(a)(4) is a permissible restric-
tion on attorney speech.  Part I also suggests that the appropriate method by which to
analyze the constitutionality of section 526(a)(4) is through the intermediate scrutiny
that the Supreme Court employed in Conant v. Walters.13  The result of that analysis
is a narrow form of the Gag Rule that was also endorsed by Judge Colloton in
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States14 and the Fifth Circuit in Hersh
v. United States ex rel. Mukasey.15
7 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(2)(A) (2006).
8 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 7, 9 (1998)
(statement of Rep. Bill McCollum); id. at 13 (statement of Rep. James P. Moran).
9 Id. at 7, 13.
10 Id. at 9. The term “gaming” has been used throughout case law to describe a debtor’s
abuse of the means test. See, e.g., Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660, 664 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007).
11 BAPCPA amended the Bankruptcy Code by adding the means test, which is embodied
in § 707(b)(2). The test measures a debtor’s ability to repay debts in the sixty months following
a filing for bankruptcy protection. If the debtor’s “current monthly income” less allowable
expenses would permit the debtor to pay either (1) the greater of 25% of non-priority un-
secured debt or $6,000; or (2) $10,000, then the debtor’s petition is presumed to be an abuse
of Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006). The mechanics and implications of the means test
are discussed more fully in Part II and the conclusion of this Note.
12 Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for liquidation proceedings in which debtors
give up all of their property in exchange for relief, in the form of a discharge, from their debts.
In reorganization proceedings under Chapters 11, 12, and 13, however, debtors usually make
payments to creditors from future income pursuant to a court-approved plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727–1321 (2006).
13 309 F.3d 629 (2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003).
14 355 B.R. 758 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006).
15 553 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2008).
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Part II of this Note suggests an analytical framework to be used in determining
what speech should be subject to the Gag Rule’s narrow form, and what speech should
be fully protected by the First Amendment.  The proposed analysis involves two steps,
asking first whether the challenged speech caused the debtor to pass the means test
where he would have otherwise failed.  The proposed analysis then considers the pre-
BAPCPA standard for determining “substantial abuse” that arose with the enactment
of the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.16  As the ensuing discussion explains, this two-
pronged analytical tool gives effect to the intent of Congress in enacting the BAPCPA
while vindicating the original intent of the Bankruptcy Code and the protective spirit
of the First Amendment.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 526(A)(4) UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
On September 9, 2008, Connecticut District Court Judge Droney held that
section 526(a)(4) of the BAPCPA violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.17  In Connecticut Bar Ass’n v. United States, the plaintiffs argued that
the provision was facially unconstitutional if construed to apply to attorneys.18  Judge
Droney found that section to be “unconstitutional as applied to attorneys and their
clients,” and enjoined the government from enforcing section 526(a)(4) against the
plaintiffs.19
Though sweeping and forceful, Judge Droney’s opinion reflects an emerging con-
currence in current BAPCPA jurisprudence.  Several courts have held that section
526(a)(4) offends the First Amendment because it is a content-based regulation that
illegally suppresses a bankruptcy attorney’s right to express his or her professional
views.20  In reaching the same conclusion, Judge Droney addressed three questions
that have emerged as especially problematic for courts grappling with the constitu-
tional uncertainty surrounding section 526(a)(4).21  His answers thereto reflect the
current majority position, and the undeniable judicial consensus that the BAPCPA
is in need of legislative reform.
A. Are Attorneys “Debt Relief Agencies” Within the Meaning of BAPCPA?
As a threshold matter, Judge Droney addressed the question of whether the
plaintiff attorneys in Connecticut Bar fit within the BAPCPA’s definition of “debt
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 157–159 (2006).
17 Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 284 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008).
18 Id. at 277.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 764–66
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2006); Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); Olsen
v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 915 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006); Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19,
25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Hersh, 553 F.3d at 743.
21 Conn. Bar Ass’n, 394 B.R. at 279–82.
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relief agency.”22  Once an attorney and or her law firm is considered a “debt relief
agency,” BAPCPA’s restrictions govern the relationship between that entity and its
debtor-clients.23  Like most courts and commentators facing this question, Judge
Droney answered in the affirmative.24  However, because the BAPCPA’s definition of
“debt relief agency” makes no direct reference to either “attorney” or “lawyer,” plain-
tiffs in other cases have made compelling arguments for a contrary interpretation.25
For example, in In re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief Agencies, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia was persuaded that attorneys
fall outside the BAPCPA’s definition of debt relief agencies.26  In that case, the court
relied on the “plain language” principle of statutory interpretation to arrive at its
conclusion:27
The § 101(12A) definition of “debt relief agency,” while extremely
broad does not include the word “attorney” or “lawyer.”  It does
include “bankruptcy petition preparer,” but that term is defined in
§ 110 and expressly excludes attorneys and their staffs.  “Attorney”
is separately defined in § 101(4), which makes no reference to debt
relief agencies or to subsection (12A).  Clearly as a matter of plain
language, “attorney” and “debt relief agency” are not synonymous
nor do they in common understanding include each other.28
Given these definitions, the Attorneys at Law court held that the term “debt relief
agency” was included in the BAPCPA to regulate “entities who interface with debtors
22 Id. at 280. BAPCPA defines a “debt relief agency” as “any person who provides any
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valu-
able consideration.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(A12) (2006). The Code defines “bankruptcy assistance”
as “any goods or services . . . provided to an assisted person with the . . . purpose of pro-
viding information, advice, counsel, document preparation, . . . or . . . legal representation”
regarding a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at § 101(4A).
23 Devan, supra note 6, at 6.
24 Conn. Bar Ass’n, 394 B.R. at 280–81; Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 19 n.1; see also Milavetz,
355 B.R. at 767; Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 576 (indicating any lawyer giving bankruptcy
assistance to “assisted person” is deemed a “debt relief agency”); Catherine E. Vance &
Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability under the New Bankruptcy
Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283, 288–89 (2005) (finding that all debtors’ lawyers are classified
as “debt relief agencies” under the new Bankruptcy Code).
25 See, e.g., Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 767–68 (“According to plaintiffs, the omission of any
reference to attorneys . . . while including a term which excludes attorneys [e.g., ‘bankruptcy
petition preparer’], shows Congress must have intended to exclude attorneys from the ‘debt
relief agency’ definition.”).
26 332 B.R. 66, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005).
27 Id. (“When construing a statute, the ordinary meaning should be read into terms unless
a special statutory definition controls.” (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,
68 (1982))).
28 Attorneys at Law, 332 B.R. at 69.
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in shadowy, gray areas not already covered by bankruptcy petition preparer regula-
tions . . . but it did not intend to regulate attorneys.”29  The court did acknowledge,
however, that another reading of the statute may lead to a different conclusion.30
Indeed, after Attorneys at Law, several courts did adopt an alternative reading
of the BAPCPA’s definitions after attempting to discern the statute’s “plain meaning.” 
For example, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Hersh v. United
States held that “the term ‘debt relief agency’ includes bankruptcy attorneys.”31  The
court reasoned that because “‘providing legal advice’ is part of the definition of bank-
ruptcy assistance” and only attorneys are authorized to do so, attorneys squarely “fit
within the definition of ‘persons providing bankruptcy assistance.’”32
In looking beyond the BAPCPA’s definitions, the Hersh court discovered two
additional factors supporting its conclusion that the statute applies to attorneys.  First,
the court pointed out that after defining the term “debt relief agency,” drafters of the
Act continued to list five exceptions.33  For the Hersh court, the fact that Congress de-
clined to list attorneys as an excepted group evinced an implied congressional intent
to regulate attorneys through the BAPCPA.34  Second, the Hersh court explained that
“legislative history clearly indicates that Congress had attorneys in mind with this
statute; the House Report on the BAPCPA mentions ‘attorney’ 164 times.”35
29 Id. at 70. In addressing the most egregious of those “gray areas,” the Court stated:
[I]t is well-known that non-lawyers often attempt to provide “legal
representation,” often to poorer, less educated, and more vulnerable citi-
zens. To do so constitutes unauthorized practice of law and may include
misdemeanor penalties under state law. . . . [T]he inclusion of the term
“legal representation” in the definition of “bankruptcy assistance” was
Congress’s effort to empower the Bankruptcy Courts presiding over a
case with authority to protect consumers . . . who may have been harmed
by a debt relief agency that may have engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, and whose existing remedies for any damage is more
theoretical than real.
Id. at 69. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 582–83 (discussing matters of state regulation
under the Tenth Amendment and BAPCPA).
30 Attorneys at Law, 332 B.R. at 69 (“The inclusion of ‘legal representation’ in the scope
of what a debt relief agency does certainly suggests a contrary result to that which I reach.”).
31 347 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
32 Id. at 23.
33 Id.
34 Id. (“[I]f Congress had wanted attorneys excluded from the term ‘debt relief agency’
(and, as a result, the requirements of BAPCPA at issue here) it surely would have taken this
opportunity to exclude them from what otherwise they are so plainly within.”).
35 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88). The House
Report lends additional supporting evidence of legislative intent to subject attorneys to
BAPCPA: “The bill’s consumer protections include provisions strengthening professionalism
standards for attorneys and others who assist consumer debtors with their bankruptcy cases.”
H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 17, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88. In addition, legislative
documents reflect that Senator Feingold proposed Amendment No. 93 to Congress during
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After Hersh, most courts accept the notion that attorneys are included in the
BAPCPA’s definition of “debt relief agency.”36  In Connecticut Bar, Judge Droney
agreed.37  However, as his opinion makes clear, the application of the statute to
attorneys does not in itself confer standing on attorneys who wish to challenge the
BAPCPA’s provisions.38
B. Do Attorneys Have Standing to Challenge Provisions of the BAPCPA Under
the “Case or Controversy” Requirement?
In Connecticut Bar, Judge Droney held that the plaintiff attorneys had standing
to sue to challenge section 526(a)(4).39  There, the government asserted that four of
the plaintiffs could not show that they suffered injury in fact as a result of the chal-
lenged provision because they were not attorneys who represented debtors in their
practices of law.40  Therefore, the government argued, the matter had not risen to the
level of a “case or controversy” within the meaning of the Constitution.41
The crux of the defendants’ argument was that “the new statute was meant to
address bankruptcy [as] part of the Bankruptcy Code”; thus, “bankruptcy assistance”
BAPCPA discussions, which would have expressly excluded lawyers from the definition of
“debt relief agency.” See 151 CONG. REC. S2316 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Feingold). The Senate did not address Senator Feingold’s proposal on that date. Id. at 2342.
36 See Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 19 n.1 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); Olsen v. Gonzales,
350 B.R. 906, 912 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
37 Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 280–81 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008).
38 Id. at 279 (discussing standing in detail despite later finding that attorneys were included
in BAPCPA’s definition of “debt relief agency”).
39 Id. The U.S. Constitution restricts federal courts to adjudicating “cases and controversies.”
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court articulated the parameters of this requirement,
setting forth a three part test for whether standing exists in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a person must show
(1) “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) there must “be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) it must be “likely . . . that the plaintiff’s
injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.
40 Plaintiffs Brown and Welsh represented only creditors, Plaintiff Sklarz stated only that
the practice of his firm included bankruptcy, and Plaintiff Roisman alleged that he focused
primarily on family law and sometimes discussed bankruptcy with his clients. Conn. Bar
Ass’n, 394 B.R. at 279.
41 See Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (explaining that
standing is part of Constitution’s case or controversy requirement, and that a party must show
invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and harm that is
actual or imminent). Another case was brought after a consumer bankruptcy attorney filed
a motion asking the court to determine his status under section 101(12A) of the Code. See
In re McCartney, 336 B.R. 588, 589–92 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (“Movant asks the Court to
determine that attorneys who practice before this Court are not debt relief agencies . . . . The
Court can only conclude that Movant has failed to satisfy the case or controversy requirement.”).
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under the BAPCPA “must mean advice given to debtors filing for bankruptcy.”42 
The court disagreed, finding “nothing in the text of the statute limit[ing] its application
to attorneys representing debtors contemplating filing for bankruptcy.”43  According
to Judge Droney, “The statute’s definition of ‘assisted person’ requires that the debts
of an assisted person be consumer debts, but it does not require that the ‘bankruptcy
assistance’ provided be with respect to that person’s debts.”44  Under that analysis,
section 526(a)(4) causes injury in fact to all attorneys who provide assistance to con-
sumers with regard to their debts, whether or not a bankruptcy proceeding is involved.
A similar standing argument appeared in Zelotes v. Martini, where the defendant
argued that the plaintiff had not suffered the required injury in fact “as no entity ha[d]
taken action to enforce BAPCPA against [the plaintiff].”45  Citing several cases dis-
cussing the uniqueness of standing doctrine in the context of the First Amendment,46
the court concluded that Zelotes was eligible to challenge the BAPCPA provision
despite the lack of threatened sanction because section 526(a)(4) posed a danger of
self-censorship.47  The resulting injury, held the court, was a chilling of the attorney’s
professional speech that the First Amendment could not permit.48
The reasoning employed in Connecticut Bar and Zelotes is consistent with the
United States District Court’s decision in New York Bar Ass’n v. Reno, where the
court found that the New York Bar Association had standing to challenge a similar
42 Conn. Bar Ass’n, 394 B.R. at 281 n.4.
43 Id. at 281.
44 Id.
45 352 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006). Zelotes, an attorney, brought an action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of section 526(a)(4) against Martini in her official capacity as
United States Trustee. Id. at 19.
46 See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988) (holding, in
the context of a First Amendment claim, that the plaintiffs had standing “as the law is aimed
directly at plaintiffs, who, if their interpretation of the statute is correct, will have to take signif-
icant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution”); Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“A plaintiff who challenges a statute must
demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation
or enforcement . . . [b]ut . . . does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury
to obtain preventive relief.”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (stating that “constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental regulations that
fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights”).
47 Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 21 (citing Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 89
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is well settled that the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”)). But see Geisenberger
v. Gonzales, 346 B.R. 678, 682 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff lacked stand-
ing to challenge section 526(a)(4) because the plaintiff failed to allege that “the federal govern-
ment or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has threatened to enforce the [provision] against
him” or that he “sustained or is in imminent danger of suffering an economic loss from the
enactment of the BAPCPA provisions” at issue).
48 Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 21–22.
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restriction on professional speech.49  In that case, the Association challenged a statute
that “made it a crime to dispose of assets in order to become eligible for Medicaid bene-
fits if the disposition of assets ‘resulted in the imposition of a period of ineligibility.’”50 
Because the Attorney General stated that the Justice Department was not likely to
enforce that statute, the government argued that the Association was not in danger of
suffering an injury,51 and the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief was therefore not
ripe for adjudication.52
In discussing the question of whether the plaintiffs’ claim was ripe, the court was
careful to explain that, where the First Amendment is implicated, customary standards
are “relaxed.”53  The court held that the plaintiffs suffered injury “[e]ven in the absence
of hardship from imminent prosecution or threat of prosecution,” because of the chill-
ing effect of the questioned law.54  According to the court:
The irreparable harm that exists here is the potential for self-
censorship among [the bar association’s] members.  [Those] mem-
bers have an ethical obligation as attorneys to respect and uphold
the law.  In fact, Plaintiff’s affidavits state that [the statute in
49 999 F. Supp. 710, 713 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). In 2006, the Olsen court discussed the district
court’s decision in Reno as it might apply to an analysis of section 526(a)(4). Olsen v. Gonzales,
350 B.R. 906, 914 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006). Although the Olsen court disagreed with the reason-
ing in Reno and arrived at a contrary conclusion, the Olsen court did acknowledge that the
plaintiffs in Olsen could have made “a similar challenge” regarding standing as the one that
proved successful for the plaintiffs in Reno. See Olsen, 350 B.R. at 914.
50 Reno, 999 F. Supp. at 712–13 (stating that section 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 “was incorporated into section 217 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996”).
51 The Department of Justice stated that the government would “neither defend the consti-
tutionality of 42 U.S.C. section 1320a-7b(a)(6) nor enforce its criminal provisions.” Attorney
General Janet Reno had “notified the United States House of Representatives and the United
States Senate that the Department of Justice would not enforce the aforementioned criminal
provisions” prior to the litigation in New York Bar Ass’n. Id. at 713.
52 Id. (“Not surprisingly, [the Government] now argues that a preliminary injunction is no
longer needed.”).
53 Id. at 715. The court explained that “the question of ripeness and injunctive relief con-
verge” in the shared requirement that injury or hardship will result if judicial consideration
is withheld
when relief against the enforcement of a criminal statute is sought, a
plaintiff generally must show either actual prosecution under the statute
or that a sufficiently real and immediate threat of prosecution exists. . . .
The customary ripeness analysis is, however, relaxed somewhat in circum-
stances involving a facial challenge implicating the First Amendment.
Id. (citing New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.
1995); Martin Tractor Co. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 627 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
54 Id.
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question] actually has resulted in [association] members refrain-
ing from providing certain counsel and assistance to clients.55
For the Reno court, injunctive relief was necessary to preclude the threatened injury—
a chilling effect on the attorneys’ professional speech.56
Because injury in fact is a prerequisite to an attorney’s ability to achieve standing
to facially challenge section 526(a)(4) of the BAPCPA, the Reno analysis should apply
to confer standing in every circumstance.57 Because section 526(a)(4) is like the statute
challenged in Reno in that it creates the potential for self-censorship among attorneys,
it injures those attorneys by chilling their professional speech.58  This particular type
of injury is ripe, even if it is neither imminent nor irreparable.59  Because the injury
asserted by the plaintiffs in Connecticut Bar and Zelotes elevated those matters to
“cases and controversies” within the meaning of Reno and established standing
doctrine, the courts in those cases were correct in finding the plaintiffs eligible to
challenge the constitutionality of section 526(a)(4).60
C. What Standard Should Be Used In Evaluating the Constitutionality of
Section 526(a)(4) Under the First Amendment?
In cases where an attorney challenges the constitutionality of section 526(a)(4),
disputes arise between the parties as to whether the court should apply strict scrutiny
or a more lenient standard of First Amendment analysis.  In Connecticut Bar, the plain-
tiff argued that strict scrutiny should be applied because the restriction in question
was content-based, and the speech to which it applied should be accorded strong
constitutional protection.61  The government argued for a less exacting standard,
55 Id. at 716.
56 Id.
57 A “facial challenge” to a statute considers only the text of the statute itself, not its
application to the particular circumstances of an individual. See City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n.11 (1988). “The Supreme Court has indicated a general
preference for as applied challenges, noting that [f]acial invalidation ‘is manifestly, strong
medicine’ that ‘has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.’” Zelotes
v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 21 n.3 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006) (quoting Nat’l Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998)).
58 Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 21 (“[P]laintiff alleges that his speech is chilled by [section
526(a)(4)], . . . and this alleged suppression since the enactment of the BAPCPA is sufficient
to establish standing.”).
59 Reno, 999 F. Supp. at 716.
60 Where the BAPCPA is concerned, challenging attorneys may have an even stronger
argument regarding their standing to sue than did the plaintiff attorneys in Reno, as no enforce-
ment body has ever threatened to take action against attorneys in violation of its provisions.
See, e.g., Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 913 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (“[T]here has been no
threatened enforcement of the BAPCPA against [the] plaintiffs.”).
61 Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 281 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008). In United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that strict scrutiny
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urging the court to employ the balancing test from Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.62 
The Gentile standard is traditionally applied to determine whether a state-enacted rule
of ethics violates the First Amendment.63
At least one court has reached a conclusion as to which standard most appropriately
applies to section 526(a)(4).64  In Hersh, the court held that strict scrutiny should be
used to evaluate that section, and that the provision failed under that test.65  The Hersh
court agreed that the government’s goal of preventing abuse of the bankruptcy system
was compelling, but that the statute was not sufficiently narrow to serve that interest
to the satisfaction of the First Amendment.66  Moreover, the court emphasized that
“[n]either 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) nor any other part of the section purports to be an
ethical standard.”67  Concluding that the Gentile standard does not apply to that sec-
tion, but recognizing that “[t]he balancing test in Gentile and the strict scrutiny test
appear to share the requirement that any restrictions on speech be narrow,” the Hersh
court advised that “the provision fails strict scrutiny for the same reasons it fails the
more lenient test.”68
Acknowledging that both strict scrutiny and the Gentile test require restrictions
be narrow limitations on speech, other courts have avoided an express articulation
requires the regulation of speech to be (1) narrowly tailored to promote (2) a compelling
government interest. 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996) (explaining that strict scrutiny allows the
“government [to] directly regulate speech to address extraordinary problems, where its regu-
lations are appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily
great restriction on speech”).
62 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). The Gentile test asks whether there is a “constitutionally per-
missible balance” between “the First Amendment rights of attorneys” and the government’s
“legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question,” and requires that (1) the ethical
restrictions serve the state’s legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question, and (2) the
restrictions imposed only narrow and necessary limitations on speech. Id. at 1075.
63 In Gentile, the Court considered a Nevada Supreme court rule “prohibiting a lawyer
from making extrajudicial statements to press that he knows or reasonably should know would
have ‘substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing’ adjudicative proceeding[s].” Id. at
1033–34. The Gentile standard was later applied in Canatella v. Stovitz, 365 F. Supp. 2d
1064 (N.D. Cal. 2005) to examine state bar statutes and professional rules designed to regulate
attorney speech in California.
64 Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 23–24 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 553 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2008).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 25. The court found that the section “is overinclusive in at least two respects: (1) it
prevents lawyers from advising clients to take lawful actions; and (2) it extends beyond abuse
to prevent advice to take prudent actions.” Id.
67 Id. at 24 n. 8; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758,
764 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006) (“While the section is certainly a rule, nothing in § 526 alludes
to ethics. The section is titled ‘Restrictions on debt relief Agencies,’ and plainly prohibits
certain acts. The advice the section forecloses may be potentially advantageous to creditors,
but this does not make it equivalent to ethics either in logic or in law.”).
68 Id. at 24 & n.8.
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of which standard is to be applied in examining the constitutionality of section
526(a)(4).  For example, in Zelotes, the court found that “[i]t is not necessary to
determine whether . . . § 526(a)(4) is an ethical regulation, and thus subject to the
Gentile standard, or whether it is a content-based regulation of attorney speech
subject to strict scrutiny.”69  Because the Zelotes court held that section 526(a)(4)
violates the First Amendment under either test, the court analyzed the statute “under
the more lenient Gentile standard.”70
D. The Highest Courts to Consider the Constitutionality of Section 526(a)(4) and
the Resulting Circuit Split
After several lower courts held that the Gag Rule violates the constitutionally-
granted right to free speech, the Eighth Circuit was charged to decide the issue in
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.71  On March 11, 2008, that court
held that the Gag Rule is “unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to . . . attorneys”
under either strict scrutiny or the lower Gentile standard.72  The court identified the
Gag Rule’s inherent constitutional defect:
[T]his prohibition would include advice constituting prudent pre-
bankruptcy planning that is not an attempt to circumvent, abuse,
or undermine the bankruptcy laws. Section 526(a)(4), as written,
prevents attorneys from fulfilling their duty to clients to give them
appropriate and beneficial advice not otherwise prohibited by the
Bankruptcy Code or other applicable law. . . .  Therefore, we
hold that [the Gag Rule] is substantially overbroad, and unconsti-
tutional as applied to attorneys who provide bankruptcy assistance
to assisted persons, as those terms are defined in the Code.73
Because of its interference with an attorney’s duty to speak forthrightly with his
clients, the Milavetz court found that section 526(a)(4) causes injury to debtors who
69 Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660, 666 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007).
70 Id.
71 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008).
72 Id. at 793. “Under strict scrutiny review, the government has the burden to prove that
the constraints on speech are supported by a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly
tailored, such that the statutory effect does not prohibit any more speech than is necessary
to serve the governmental interest.” Id. at 792. Under the more lenient Gentile standard, which
is traditionally applied in the context of First Amendment challenges to ethical restrictions on
attorney speech, the rights of attorneys are first balanced against the “government’s legitimate
interest in regulating the activity in question”; next, the court “determine[s] whether the regu-
lations impose[d] ‘only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech.’” Id. at 793
(quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991)).
73 Id. at 793–94 (footnotes omitted).
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require the assistance of counsel.74  And because “it is well settled that the loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably consti-
tutes irreparable injury,”75 the Gag Rule also causes permanent damage to attorneys
under the Milavetz reading of the rule.
In dissent to the majority’s opinion in Milavetz, Judge Colloton reminded the
court that “[w]hen presented with a constitutional challenge to an Act of Congress, we
have not only the power, but the duty, to adopt a narrowing construction that will
avoid constitutional difficulties whenever possible.”76  According to Colloton, the
phrase “in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy” should be construed to connote
“actions taken with the intent to abuse the protections of the bankruptcy system.”77
In support of his conclusion, Colloton insightfully recognized that the phrase “in
contemplation of filing” is a term of art in the bankruptcy context.78  Indeed, the term
is often used in discussion of preferential payments and fraudulent transfers.79  Under
the Bankruptcy Code, such transactions are unlawful because they are made within
the ninety day “zone of insolvency” in which a debtor is in contemplation of filing for
bankruptcy and under a duty to preserve his assets for the benefit of the estate.80  Thus,
in bankruptcy, the phrase “in contemplation of filing” is used to modify the actions
of nefarious debtors who abuse the protections of the bankruptcy system to the detri-
ment of his estate’s ultimate beneficiaries.81
If the Gag Rule is read to prohibit attorneys from advising debtors to incur only
detrimental additional debt (debt that would be harmful to the estate), then the rule
simply reinforces the ethical principle that attorneys cannot advise their clients to take
unlawful actions.82  Because the debtor’s assumption of detrimental debt on the eve
of bankruptcy would be unlawful under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor’s attorney
74 Id. at 793.
75 Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
76 Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 798 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330–31 (1988)). Judge
Colloton also noted that “[i]t is therefore incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate
those [constitutional] doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.” Id. (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994)).
77  See id. at 799.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., In re Damron Cost. Co., Inc., 218 B.R. 371 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1997) (applying
a Kentucky statute defining a preferential transfer as on that is made “in contemplation of insol-
vency,” and “with the design to prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion . . . of others”).
80 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006); see also In re Amcast Indus. Corp., 365 B.R. 91 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2007) (discussing unlawful transfers made within the preference period).
81 Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 799 (citing In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 616 (1843) (concluding that
an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done with “inten[t] to defeat the
general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy”)).
82 For example, an attorney’s duty of confidentiality, which totally covers the client’s ad-
mission of guilt, does not extend to a client’s plans to engage in future unlawful conduct. See
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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is already ethically prohibited from advising his client to take such improper steps.83 
Interpreted this way, the Gag Rule not only allows attorneys to advise their clients to
incur additional debt that is beneficial, but avoids imposing limitations on an attor-
ney’s right to speak freely that do not exist in the canons of ethics to which they are
already bound.
Judge Colloton also pointed out that the Gag Rule’s system of sanctions leads
naturally to a narrowing interpretation such as the one he suggests:
An attorney who violates [the Gag Rule] can be sanctioned in just
three situations: if a debtor sues the attorney for the available rem-
edies—remittal of fees, actual damages, and reasonable attorneys
fees and costs; if a state attorney general sues for a resident’s actual
damages; or if a court finds that the attorney intentionally violated
§ 526(a)(4), and chooses to impose an appropriate civil penalty. 
The remedies for violation thus emphasize actual damages.84
Based on the foregoing, Judge Colloton explained that “legal and appropriate
advice that would be protected by the First Amendment, yet prohibited by a broad
reading of [the Gag Rule], should cause no damage at all.”85 He continued:
If an attorney advises a debtor to refinance his home to lower
mortgage payments, or to purchase a reliable car to enable him to
pay off his debts, then a debtor following that advice would suf-
fer no damages. There is no reason to believe that a client could
recover the remittal of attorney’s fees or that a court would find
a civil penalty “appropriate” as a remedy for legal advice that
benefits both the debtor and his creditors.86
In contrast, a debtor is likely to have a remedy against an attorney if he is advised
to file an abusive petition and his case is dismissed under the means test.87  Damages
would also be imposed “where an attorney general or a court has reason to seek or
impose sanctions against an abusive debt relief agency.”88  In sum, under Congress’s
statutory scheme, damages can only arise where an attorney has caused a client to
incur damaging debt.  Beneficial debt is not contemplated by the statute, and should
be kept outside the scope of the Gag Rule’s application.89
83 See id.
84 Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 800 (internal citation omitted).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id.
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Nine months after the Eighth Circuit spoke, the Fifth Circuit became the second
federal appellate bench to consider the Gag Rule’s constitutionality.  In reviewing the
district court decision in Hersh v. United States, the Fifth Circuit offered a whole-
hearted endorsement of Judge Colloton’s view, upholding the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance and a limiting interpretation of section 526(a)(4).90  According to
the court, the statute should be construed
to prevent only a debt relief agency’s advice to a debtor to incur
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy when doing so would be an
abuse of the bankruptcy system.  In so interpreting the statute, we
avoid the constitutionality questions raised by Hersh (and those
relied on by the Milavetz majority), and conclude that the statute
only affects unprotected speech.91
The Hersh court shared Judge Colloton’s concern that section 526(a)(4), as
written, creates a blanket prohibition on attorneys advising clients to take on addi-
tional debt, even when doing so would be entirely warranted by a debtor’s financial
circumstances.92
To compel the court’s ultimate conclusion, Hersh provided five distinct examples
of when her clients should properly be advised to incur new debt before filing for
bankruptcy.93 The court noted that “[t]he government generally takes the position
that in nonabusive situations of [the kind outlined by Hersh], section 526(a)(4) does
not preclude advice to incur the debt.”94  As the government’s concession before the
Fifth Circuit indicates, section 526(a)(4) should not be taken literally. The court agreed
in finding that, should it be understood according to its words, the statute “would raise
serious constitutional problems because . . . it would restrict some speech that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”95 Accordingly, the court construed section 526(a)(4)
to prevent a debt relief agency from advising a debtor to incur debt in contemplation
of bankruptcy when doing so would be an abuse of the bankruptcy system.96 Under
the First Amendment, then, the statute only touches unprotected speech.97
90 See Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2008). The court also
held that attorneys who provide “bankruptcy assistance” to an “assisted person” qualify as
“debt relief agencies” when they receive payment of money or other valuable consideration
for such services. Id. at 752.
91 Id. at 756.
92 Id. at 754.
93 Id. at 754 n. 10.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 754.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 761. For a thorough and useful summary of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, see Hon.
Nancy C. Dreher, Fifth Circuit Rules That Consumer Debtors’ Attorneys are “Debt Relief
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E. The Correct Constitutionality Analysis—Conant v. Walters Meets Judge
Colloton and the Fifth Circuit
Constitutional challenges to professional speech arising outside the attorney-
client relationship provide helpful guidance to analysis of the Gag Rule.  In Conant
v. Walters, the Ninth Circuit addressed a statutory restriction on speech that was much
like the Gag Rule, but applied in a medical context.98  In that case, a group of patients
and physicians brought a First Amendment challenge to the enforcement of a govern-
ment policy threatening to punish physicians for conversing with their patients about
the medical uses of marijuana.99
The dispute “focused on the government’s policy of investigating doctors or
initiating proceedings against doctors . . . because they ‘recommended’ the use of
marijuana” to their ill patients.100  In the district court, the government argued that such
recommendations led to illegal use.101  However, that court found that there are many
legitimate uses of marijuana in the medical context.102  “For example, the doctor could
seek to place the patient in a federally approved, experimental marijuana therapy pro-
gram.  Alternatively, the patient upon receiving the recommendation could petition
the government to change the law.”103
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the government policy did “strike at
the core” First Amendment interests of doctors and patients.104  The court explained
that “[a]n integral component of the practice of medicine is the communication be-
tween a doctor and a patient.  Physicians must be able to speak frankly and openly to
patients.”105  Further, the court recognized that the need for doctor-patient communi-
cation has been endorsed in the courts through the development and continued appli-
cation of the common law doctor-patient privilege.106
The court in Conant also rejected the government’s argument that being a member
of a regulated profession results in a surrender of First Amendment rights.107  Citing
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,108 the court stated a contrary opinion: “professional
speech may be entitled to ‘the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer.’”109
Agencies” and That DRA Provisions of BAPCPA Having to do with Advice to Clients and
Disclosure are Constitutional, 2 BANKR. SERV. CURRENT AWARENESS ALERT 8 (Feb. 2009).
98 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
99 Id. at 632.
100 Id. at 634.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.(internal citation omitted).
104 Id. at 636.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 637.
108 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995).
109 Conant, 309 F.3d at 637.
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According to the court in Conant, “[T]o survive First Amendment scrutiny, the
government’s policy must have the requisite ‘narrow specificity.’”110  However, the
court concluded that the government’s policy failed this standard as it left “doctors
and patients ‘no security for free discussion,’” and that “physicians have been forced
to suppress speech that would not rise to the level of that which the government con-
stitutionally may prohibit.”111  The court in Conant did not suggest that the govern-
ment should cease its efforts to end abuse of marijuana through regulations on the
medical profession.  Rather, the court held that “[i]f the First Amendment means
anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort.  Yet here
it seems to have been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”112
At this analytical juncture, the reasoning in Conant v. Walters reaches near
perfect alignment with Judge Colloton’s views as adopted in Hersh v. United States. 
The Gag Rule is the first strategy the government thought to try in precluding abuses
of the bankruptcy system through gaming of the means test, as indicated by the fact that
the two provisions were enacted simultaneously.113  Its restriction on speech, therefore,
should be broadly and literally interpreted only as a last resort.  An equally effective
and less restrictive approach is to construe the statute with the “narrow specificity”
demanded by Conant, urged by Judge Colloton, and adopted wholesale by the Fifth
Circuit in Hersh.114  For the Gag Rule, this means that the words “in contemplation
of bankruptcy” should be taken to mean “with the intent to abuse the protections of
the bankruptcy system.”115
Although the limiting interpretation does avoid the Gag Rule’s problems under
the First Amendment, other difficulties will arise in applying the new, narrow-form
variation of the statute.  At the first instance, courts will struggle with the task of
identifying the types of speech that are properly subject to the new and narrow rule. 
Part II of this Note seeks to provide a coherent approach to meeting that challenge. 
The analytical framework presented is consistent with the intent of Congress in enact-
ing the BAPCPA as well as the Federal Judgeship Act, and faithful to the broader
mission of the Bankruptcy Code as historically interpreted by federal courts.
II. TO WHAT SPEECH SHOULD THE GAG RULE APPLY IN ITS NEW AND NARROW
FORM?
This section posits that to identify speech to which the narrow-form Gag Rule
applies, courts should engage in a two-step inquiry into the effect of the speech
itself.  First, a court should determine whether or not the speech at issue causes a
110 Id. at 639.
111 Id.(internal citation omitted).
112 Id. at 637 (citing Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)).
113 Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 761 (5th Cir. 2008).
114 See Hersh, 553 F.3d at 757; Conant, 309 F.3d at 639.
115 Hersh, 553 F.3d at 753.
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consumer debtor to pass the means test where he or she would otherwise fail.  In other
words, this initial step asks whether, but for the challenged speech, the means test
would prohibit the debtor from obtaining relief under Chapter 7.  If the question
yields an affirmative result, a presumption of Gag Rule applicability should arise.
Next, a court should proceed to the second step of the analysis which searches for
rebuttal by resurrecting the Chapter 7 eligibility standard employed after 1984 and
prior to 2005.  The second prong of the proposed framework asks whether the speech
in question causes the debtor to commit a “substantial abuse” under the Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 as judicially interpreted by bankruptcy courts.  If the answer
is yes, then the speech should be regulated by the narrow-form Gag Rule.  If the
answer is no, then the presumption of applicability is properly rebutted and a court
should refrain from applying the Gag Rule to the speech in question.
A. Step One: Advice to Incur Debt that Leads to Means Test Failure—A
Presumption of Applicability
Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) embodies the BAPCPA’s rigid “means test,”
which sets forth an income-based standard for a consumer’s admission to Chapter 7.116 
Because the test only affords debtors in the “worst” financial conditions the opportunity
for discharge through liquidation, some debtors have incentive to incur additional debt
to ensure eligibility for Chapter 7 relief.
1. Purposes and Precepts of the Means Test
By nearly all accounts, the BAPCPA has wrought an unprecedented transformation
of the Bankruptcy Code as it pertains to individual debtors.117  As Brubaker notes,
“[t]he Bankruptcy Act of 1898 established for the first time a permanent federal bank-
ruptcy system in which individual debtors could freely and voluntarily avail them-
selves of a liberal bankruptcy discharge of indebtedness.”118  Through a surrender of
nonexempt assets and without creditor consent, consumers were empowered to finan-
cially rehabilitate without imposition by lenders.119  This system “remained a seem-
ingly indelible fixture of federal bankruptcy law until the advent of BAPCPA, which
restricts both individual debtors’ access to such a ‘liquidation’ discharge (through
chapter 7) and the scope of the relief afforded by such a chapter 7 discharge.”120
116 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (providing that a petition may be dismissed if the
individual debtor fails to satisfy the means test standards).
117 See, e.g., In re Baker, 390 B.R. 524 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006); Ralph Brubaker, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy: Assessing a
New Paradigm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1.
118 Brubaker, supra note 117, at 1 (citing Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or
Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 343 (1999)).
119 Id.
120 Id.
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Congress’s unambiguous intent in enacting the BAPCPA was to discourage con-
sumers from pursuing liquidation under Chapter 7.121  The BAPCPA clearly prefers
that consumers seek to discharge their debts, if at all, by filing under Chapter 13.122 
“A Chapter 13 discharge is normally granted only upon completion of the debtor’s
Chapter 13 repayment plan, usually at least three years after her petition has been
filed.”123  In most cases, a plan will not be confirmed unless it provides for the full
repayment of all secured creditors from the debtor’s future earnings in the form of
periodic installments.124  Thus, unlike the Chapter 7 debtor, who is free to use his post-
petition income in regaining a financial foothold, an individual proceeding through
Chapter 13 remains encumbered by his debts for the duration of his plan.125
Because most consumer debtors cannot satisfy their debts through liquidation,
creditors benefit when they are guaranteed repayment through future income streams.126 
It is unsurprising, then, that the unsecured creditors’ lobby was particularly active
during the period in which the BAPCPA underwent congressional consideration.127 
Political pressures notwithstanding, Congress justified the BAPCPA’s provisions
by pointing to “substantial abuse” of Chapter 7, asserting that the integrity of the
Bankruptcy Code depended on a legislative end to such behavior.128  Pursuant to that
objective, Congress vested the BAPCPA with a rigid “means test,” which has proven
121 The National Consumer Law Center takes a more sinister view of the BAPCPA:
From its Orwellian title (the Act is clearly not a ‘Consumer Protection
Act’) to the last of its 512 pages, the 2005 Act presents numerous chal-
lenges to attorneys who represent consumer debtors. How such terrible
legislation could be passed by Congress is a story of money, political
mean-spiritedness, and intellectual dishonesty.
HENRY SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (8th ed. 2006).
122 Kibbe v. Sumski, 361 B.R. 302, 312–14 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R.
1, 17–18 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2007) (noting “Congress’ expressed preference for the maximal re-
payment of debt” to creditors).
123 JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY § 13.05, at 513
(2d ed. 2007).
124 Chapter 13 plans usually provide for the repayment of a specified percentage of unse-
cured debts. However, secured and “super-priority” interests, such as domestic support obli-
gations and administrative claims, are paid out first. See In re Warner, 115 B.R. 233 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1989) (discussing priority scheme required for plan confirmation under Chapter 13).
125 FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 123, § 13.05, at 513–14.
126 Most filings under Chapter 7 are “no asset” liquidations in which the debtor’s only assets
are those that are exempted by the Bankruptcy Code and therefore not subject to liquidation.
The practical result of this reality is that most debtors filing under Chapter 7 receive a discharge
of indebtedness for “free,” as the creditors receive no payout from the bankruptcy estate. See
id. § 17.01, at 603.
127 See, e.g., Barry Rehfeld, Top Creditor Lobbyist Tassey Goes for Broke, AM. BANKER,
May 17, 2001, at 1 (explaining how a lobbyist-produced report became the framework for
the BAPCPA).
128 In re Lindstrom, 381 B.R. 303, 308 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007).
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to be the most complicated barrier to the commencement of a Chapter 7 case since
the Act became enforced as federal law.129
2. The Mechanics of the Means Test Explained
Virtually any individual qualifies for voluntary liquidation under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code.130  This broad eligibility rule must nevertheless be read in con-
junction with the de facto limitation placed on consumer debtors by section 707(b).131 
That provision requires a court to determine whether a debtor has sufficient dispos-
able income to make meaningful payments to creditors under a Chapter 13 plan.132 
If such ability exists, the debtor’s petition will be dismissed as “abusive” of Chapter 7,
and the case will be dismissed or converted to a proceeding under Chapter 13.133
a. A Mathematical Formula for Identifying Abusive Petitions
With the BAPCPA came a sweeping change to the analysis formerly employed
by courts in identifying abuse in consumer bankruptcy filings.134  In place of the sub-
jective evaluation described in former section 707(b), the BAPCPA imposed a cold
calculation—a mathematical “means test” by which consumer worthiness for Chapter 7
is numerically ascertained.135
Prior to the BAPCPA’s enactment, courts would typically consider the totality of
the circumstances in any given case to ensure the absence of “substantial abuse” in a
Chapter 7 petition.136  For example, in Green v. Staples, the Fourth Circuit reversed
129 In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 458 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (“BAPCPA was
intended to address what Congress perceived to be certain abuses of the bankruptcy process.
Among the abuses identified by Congress was the easy access to chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceedings by consumer debtors, who if required to file under chapter 13, could afford to pay
some dividend to their unsecured creditors.”).
130 FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 123, § 17.02, at 604–05.
131 Hon. Thomas Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory
Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195,
221 (2007).
132 Id.
133 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(a), 1307(a) (2006).
134 Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of
the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 135, 136–37 (2007).
135 In re Davis, 348 B.R. 449, 452–53 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).
136 Before the BAPCPA’s effective date, the Bankruptcy Code provided, in relevant part: 
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any
party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under
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the district court’s decision to grant the dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition after finding
that the court should apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine a debtor’s
potential “substantial abuse.”137  The court was careful to explain that the debtor’s
surplus income did not alone justify the dismissal, but that other factors such as the
debtor’s health, his pre-petition conduct in borrowing funds, and his apparent lack of
good faith in filing supported the conclusion that the petition was abusively filed.138 
Under the pre-BAPCPA regime, therefore, judges were free to use broad discretion
in affording or denying Chapter 7 relief, and rendered that decision based on facts
never appearing on a debtor’s balance sheet.
The means test in the BAPCPA allows for no such subjective discretion, as it con-
fines courts to consider a debtor’s surplus income as the primary factor in determining
whether a Chapter 7 petition is abusive.139  As currently drafted, the means test is like
a double-edged sword, threatening two separate injuries to consumers who fail to
meet its rigid requirements.  First, the means tests requires a comparison between the
median income in the debtor’s state and the debtor’s annual earnings.140  If the debtor’s
income is greater than the state median, abuse is presumed as a matter of law.141  In
order to rebut this presumption, a debtor must show that his net monthly income,142
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of
this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
137 Green v. Staples, 934 F.2d 568, 572–73 (4th Cir. 1991).
138 Id.
139 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. I, at 6 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92; see
also In re Ellringer, 370 B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007) (citing 151 CONG. REC. S2470
(daily ed. March 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Nelson) (“First and foremost, the bill will curb
abuse of the bankruptcy system by implementing a means test to ensure that those who can
afford to repay some portion of their unsecured debts are required to do so.”)); Marianne B.
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?,
13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 699 (2005) (“Congress has replaced judicial discretion on
ability to pay in chapter 7 abuse cases with a detailed formula. . . . [U]ntil Congress revises it,
the means test displaces judicial tests of ability to pay.”).
140 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) provides:
In considering . . . whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of
the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the
debtor’s current monthly income reduced by [applicable exemptions]
and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of (i) 25 percent of the
debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,575, whichever
is greater; or (II) $10,950 (internal reference omitted).
141 Id.
142 Net monthly income is gross monthly income (from all sources) less certain allowable
expenses that are taken in principal part from federal IRS standards applicable to income
taxation calculations. See id. § (b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
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when multiplied by sixty,143 is less than $10,000 and less than the greater of 1) $6,000
or 2) 25% of the unsecured debt he owes.144
To illustrate, let us review an example one commentator has discussed.145
Suppose Debtor A nets $40 per month in income.  “Multiplying by sixty produces
$2,400.  This is less than $10,000 and less than $6,000,” so, according to the means
test, Debtor A is not a bankruptcy abuser.146  However, if Debtor B’s net income is
$110 per month, the product is $6,600.  “This is less than $10,000 but more than
$6,000. [Debtor B] must now show that unsecured claims against [him] exceed
$26,400” in order to pass the BAPCPA’s means test.147  Finally, consider Debtor C,
whose net income is $167.77 per month.  Since multiplication by sixty yields a result
that exceeds $10,000, Debtor C fails the means test and is subject to the presumption
that he is an abuser of Chapter 7.148  For Debtors B and C, then, the BAPCPA poten-
tially forecloses an opportunity that would have been available under the old “totality
of the circumstances” test: the chance to demonstrate at the outset that non-financial
factors justify his application to Chapter 7.
True, an inquiry into the “totality of the circumstances” did not disappear com-
pletely from the abuse analysis as amended by the BAPCPA.  Proponents of the means
test will quickly point out that it appears unambiguously in section 707(b)(2)(D)(3).149 
However, a close reading of the new statute reveals that the court may only consider
the totality of the circumstances where a debtor’s income is below the state median.150 
143 The significance of the number sixty is in its relation to the duration of a typical
Chapter 13 plan. However, the use of this number is often criticized for its failure to recognize
that the Bankruptcy Code does not mandate five-year plans for all consumers. Only above-
median income debtors are required to maintain five-year plans, while below-median debtors
can write three-year plans. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy
Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 267–68 (2007) (citing In re McPherson,
350 B.R. 38, 45–46 (Bankr. W.D.Va. 2006)); see also Chelsey W. Tulis, Get Real: Reframing
the Debate over How to Calculate Projected Disposable Income in § 1325(b), 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 345, 353–61 (2009) (suggesting that the means test provides above-median income debtors
an advantage over below-median debtors).
144 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2006) provides that satisfaction of the means test insulates
the debtor from the presumption of abuse arising under § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
145 This example appears in Carlson, supra note 143, at 266–68.
146 Id. at 266.
147 Id. at 267.
148 Id. at 268.
149 That section provides:
In considering . . . whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of
the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption [of
abuse] does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider (A) whether
the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of the cir-
cumstances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D)(3).
150 See Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living With the Means Test, 31 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 463, 467 (2007).
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Such debtors are protected from an initial presumption of abuse, but still may fail the
means test if the “totality of the circumstances” so require.151  Said another way, the
totality of the circumstances test, when employed according to the BAPCPA, operates
only to establish that a petition is abusive.152  It does not work to save a debtor from
dismissal, as it would have under the pre-BAPCPA regime.153
The BAPCPA’s vision of the “totality of the circumstances” is entirely consistent
with its omission of an important phrase which appeared in the pre-BAPCPA section
707(b).  Prior to 2005, that section included an affirmative command that “[t]here shall
be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.”154  Though
its absence is often overlooked, the amended section 707(b) is conspicuously lacking
in any such suggestion.155  Indeed, the first edge of the means test cuts sharply against
the debtor, and intends to sever him from the possibility of obtaining discharge of
indebtedness through liquidation proceedings.
b. The Means Test Causes Uncertainty in Chapter 13
The means test’s blade makes a second cut when a debtor, who has been denied
access to Chapter 7, files for relief under Chapter 13.  In this context, the cause of in-
jury is a drafting imprecision—the result is financial bleeding that continues unabated
over the plan’s repayment term.  This danger was recognized early by Judge Nelms
in In re Hardacre, when he noticed a stark discrepancy between the BAPCPA’s treat-
ment of income standards in Chapters 7 and 13.156  Under the Act, a debtor’s “current
monthly income” shall be used to determine Chapter 7 eligibility, while his “projected
disposable income” must be used in evaluating his ability to make payments under a
Chapter 13 plan.157  Consequently, after the BAPCPA amendments, the Bankruptcy
Code directs that “projected disposable income” is the operative figure to be employed
in a court’s determination of the amount a debtor must pay in each installment to
satisfy his repayment obligations over the life of the plan.158
Although the BAPCPA defines the term “current monthly income” as the aver-
age of monies received or earned over the six months prior to the bankruptcy filing,
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
155 See In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[P]re-BAPCPA
§ 707(b)’s ‘presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor’ has been
removed, and been replaced with post-BAPCPA § 707(b)(2)’s presumption of abuse against
debtors who, as determined by the means test, have sufficient monthly disposable income to
repay a portion of their unsecured debts”); accord, In re Vogeler, 393 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2008).
156 338 B.R. 718, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
157 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i), 1325(b)(1)(B) (2006).
158 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006).
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the statute fails to provide a single, precise definition of “projected disposable in-
come.”159  Accepting that the terms are not interchangeable, Judge Nelms concluded
in Hardacre that “projected disposable income” must be a forward looking figure,
“based upon the debtor’s anticipated income during the term of the plan.”160  Accord-
ing to this reasoning, a debtor in Chapter 13 will not be evaluated as he was when he
filed for Chapter 7, as his demonstrated “current monthly income” is meaningless in
developing a plan of repayment.161  Thus, according to Judge Nelms and those who
share his understanding of the Act, a debtor’s fate in Chapter 13 depends not on the
quality of his financial records, but instead on the accuracy of his crystal ball.
At the present time, the Hardacre opinion cannot fairly be cast as the prevailing
majority view.  As one observer notes: “[F]or every case holding one way, one will
find an equally opposing case with the same facts.”162  Apart from causing courts
such division, the BAPCPA’s imprecision can inflict serious wounds on a bankrupt
consumer.  Because he is largely unable to predict, at the outset of his case, whether
plan payments will be calculated based on his “current monthly income”163 or accord-
ing to speculative assessments presented to the court,164 an individual risks his future
fiscal viability in filing for Chapter 13.  In the event that his “projected disposable in-
come” does not reflect his long-term ability to pay, the means test will bind him to
a plan that he simply cannot afford to carry out.
For the trepidatious consumer, legislative history sheds more darkness than light
on the intended meaning of “projected disposable income.”  Congressional testimony
reveals that the term was included in the BAPCPA to allow courts to consider
anticipated changes in a debtor’s financial circumstances during the life of a Chapter
13 plan.165  Very well, but how, then, does the BAPCPA account for unanticipated
changes in a debtor’s financial viability?  After all, unexpected economic changes are
often the very events that precipitate the filing of consumer bankruptcies.166  This was
159 See id.; Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 722 (“[T]he phrase ‘projected disposable income’ is
subject to conflicting interpretations.”).
160 Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 722.
161 See id.
162 Jennifer Emens-Butler, Bankruptcy Reform, Part II: Chicken Little Still Looking
Skyward . . ., 33 VT. B.J. 28, Spring 2007, at 29.
163 See, e.g., In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (holding that a debtor’s actual
budgeted surplus income would not be considered because the “current monthly income” of
the means test controlled).
164 See, e.g., In re Kibbe, 342 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D.N.H.) (holding that actual income would
be used as projected under plan and not according to means test where debtor’s income in-
creased shortly after filing), aff’d sub nom., Kibbe v. Sumski, 361 B.R. 302 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2007).
165 In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1, 12 & n.8, 17 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2007) (discussing congressional
intent, including one of BAPCPA’s co-sponsors, Iowa Senator Charles “Chuck” Grassley’s,
understanding of the statute’s purpose).
166 See, e.g., In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 211 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (considering
whether the bankruptcy was filed because of a “sudden illness, calamity, disability, or
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the question presented to the court in In re Hanks,167 and the court’s response cuts
against the second edge of the means test’s double-sided blade.
In Hanks, the debtors, who were husband and wife, suffered a “substantial re-
duction in income . . . both before and after the date of filing.”168  The decline was
occasioned when Mr. Hanks lost his job as a computer programmer and, consequently,
his salary of over $64,000 per year.169  Unable to find similarly lucrative work, Mr.
Hanks took a position as a movie reviewer, yielding an annual income of less than
$23,000.170  Anticipating inability to satisfy debts coming due, the Hankses filed for
bankruptcy protection soon after Mr. Hanks became unemployed.171  Because the
Hankses’ current monthly income was calculated based on a six-month earning history,
the Hankses did not qualify for Chapter 7 relief.172  According to that standard, their
income was sufficiently high as to allow them to enter a plan of repayment.173
Upon filing under Chapter 13, the Hankses learned that their plan repayments
were to be calculated using the “projected disposable income” standard appearing in
the BAPCPA.174  Noting that this term was undefined, the court in Hanks reasoned
that it could only refer to the amount produced when the debtor’s current monthly
income was multiplied by the plan commitment period.175  Thus, the court concluded
that the Hankses were obliged to pay $666.78 per month—a figure well beyond their
realistic means—to fund their Chapter 13 plan.176  Upon the Hankses’ objection, the
court answered that the BAPCPA compelled the result:
Whether justified or not, the result of Congress’ efforts was “a
law that is sometimes self-executing, inflexible, and unforgiving.” 
It is not at all clear that Congress did not actually intend to keep
people out of bankruptcy altogether if possible . . . .  Ultimately,
unemployment” as a factor in determining a debtor’s ability make regular payments under
his Chapter 13 plan).
167 In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494 (Bankr. N.D. Utah 2007).
168 Id. at 496.
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 496–97.
173 See id. at 496.
174 See id. at 499.
175 Interestingly, after Hanks, courts in Utah shifted to Judge Nelms’s view that “projected
disposable income” was a purely forward looking figure. Under this interpretation, however,
the result in Hanks would have been the same. Because Mr. Hanks expected to find similar em-
ployment during the plan commitment period, his “projected monthly income” would still have
been artificially and unsustainably high. Courts do not permit unemployed debtors who are
seeking re-employment to project their income at an “unemployment level.” See In re Liverman
383 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2008); In re Purdy, 373 B.R. 142 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2007).
176 Hanks, 362 B.R. at 496, 500–02.
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it is not within this Court’s power nor is it this Court’s role to
change Congress’ intentional policy choices or to save it from its
inadvertent drafting errors.177
What became of the Hankses remains unknown, but it is clear that the court left
the couple trapped between two equally dismal fates.  In the first possible scenario,
the Hankses would succeed in making their monthly payments by borrowing from
“predatory” lenders at high interest rates or through increased use of credit cards to
pay for other living expenses.178  Discharge would ensue from Chapter 13, but more
debt would remain to perpetuate the Hankses’ financial disability.
In an alternative scenario, the Hankses would default on their Chapter 13 plan. 
The bankruptcy court would revoke its promise of discharge, and the couple would
again face their creditors—but without the protection of the Bankruptcy Code.179  In
either possible outcome, the Hankses are left exposed, wounded by the means test,
and without the possibility for financial rehabilitation.  Creditors emerge victorious
in either possible case, and the double-edged means test is proven powerful in prevent-
ing consumer access to successful discharge in Chapter 7.
3. Why a Rebuttable Presumption Properly Arises When Attorney Speech Causes
a Debtor to Fail the Means Test
With an understanding of the means test’s harsh effects, it is easy to empathize
with the attorney who wishes for his clients to avoid a potential failure.  However,
Congress and the BAPCPA expressly prohibit attorneys from giving their debtor-clients
advice to incur more debt for the mere sake of passing the means test’s rigors.180  As
177 Id. at 500–02 (internal citations omitted).
178 In general, a “predatory” loan is one in which the borrower receives no reasonable antic-
ipated financial benefit as a result of the loan. Specifically, the Federal Reserve defines preda-
tory lending as that which includes one or more of the following attributes: (1) “[m]aking
unaffordable loans based on the assets of the borrower rather than on the borrower’s ability
to repay [the] obligation,” (2) “[i]nducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly in order
to charge high . . . fees each time the loan is refinanced,” or (3) “[e]ngaging in fraud or de-
ception to conceal the true nature of the loan obligation . . . from an unsuspecting or unsophis-
ticated borrower.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION LETTER 01-4, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 10–11
(2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf;
Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2009).
179 Material default in terms of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan can be cause for relief from
automatic stay and can be cause for dismissal of Chapter 13 case. When the automatic stay
is lifted, secured creditors may proceed in foreclosure against collateral according to state law
embodied in its adopted version of UCC Article 9. See In re Brown, 70 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1986).
180 Indeed, this was the original intent of Congress in enacting the Gag Rule. See supra
notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
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a first step to distinguishing good advice to incur more debt from that which is
abusive, a court must regard with suspicion any advice that causes a debtor to pass
the means test when he would otherwise be unable to do so.
To illustrate, suppose Attorney advised Debtor, whose income was above the
state median, to take an unsecured loan to finance medical expenses prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition.  The purpose of taking a loan rather than attempting to pay out
of pocket was allegedly to have enough cash on hand to make required monthly pay-
ments on other borrowed funds.  Debtor’s net monthly income was $110, resulting
in a product of $6,600.181  Under the means test, Debtor is a presumed abuser and may
only rebut that presumption by showing that the unsecured claims against him exceed
$26,400.182  If the loan from Bank causes Debtor to so demonstrate, the attorney’s
advice to incur the additional unsecured amount should be presumptively subject to
the narrow-form Gag Rule under the proposed analysis.
Two considerations support the correctness of this result.  First, the BAPCPA’s
original Gag Rule sought to implicate only attorney speech that bore a causal rela-
tionship to a debtor’s passage of the means test.183  Extending the rule to advice that
does not cause a debtor to cross the line from failure into passage does nothing to
further the BAPCPA’s aims.  Second, the narrow-form Gag Rule does not intend to
apply to all speech that causes a debtor to pass the means test, only that which is uttered
“‘with the intent to abuse the protections of the bankruptcy system.’”184  It is thus
appropriate that the causation of a debtor to pass the means test establishes only a
presumption that the narrow-form Gag Rule should apply.  For the purposes of the
proposed analysis, the causation of a means test failure evokes a suspicion—rather
than a determination—that the speech at issue may be constitutionally restrained.
B. Step Two: Rebuttal Evidence Found Through Application of the Federal
Judgeship Act’s “Substantial Abuse” Criteria
As was described in Part II.A.2, the hallmark of the pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy
abuse regime was judicial discretion.  Prior to 1984, access to Chapter 7 was “virtually
unfettered.”185  “Courts could only dismiss cases for cause, requiring egregious acts
on the part of the debtor.”186  In effect, “consumer debtors could easily discharge all
of their debts under Chapter 7 without regard to their financial situation” as long as they
were honest and forthcoming with the court.187  Creditors disliked this environment,
181 See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the relevant mechanics of the means test.
182 See supra Part II.A.2.
183 See, e.g., Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660, 665 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007).
184 Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 756 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Milavetz v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2008)).
185 Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act,
57 DUKE L.J. 789, 795 (2007).
186 Adam D. Herring, Fixing the Broken Machine: Means Testing and Secured Debt
Payments Under BAPCPA, NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., Feb. 2006, at 103.
187 Id.
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and sought to change it through the legislative process.188  In response, Congress en-
acted the Federal Judgeship Act (FJA) in 1984.189
Under the FJA, judges could dismiss cases only if they presented “substantial
abuse” of the Bankruptcy Code.190  The task of the courts was then to define “sub-
stantial abuse,” as Congress had not seen it fit to do so.191  In most circuits, the pri-
mary determining factor for finding substantial abuse was the debtor’s ability to repay
its creditors.192  The debtor’s ability to repay was assessed by deducting reasonable
monthly expenses from anticipated monthly income.193 Although the debtor’s ability
to repay was a factor in determining what constituted substantial abuse, bankruptcy
judges retained considerable discretion to consider other factors.194
At this stage in the proposed analysis, judges should retain similar discretion
in determining whether speech that has caused a debtor to fail the means test was
uttered “‘with the intent to abuse the protections of the bankruptcy system.’”195  By
allowing judges to observe the factors employed in the “substantial abuse” inquiry
under the FJA, the proposed analysis affords debtors and their attorneys a modicum
of judicial consideration for the realities with which a financially overburdened
consumer must contend.
Return for a moment to our illustrative Debtor, who took an unsecured loan from
Bank prior to filing for bankruptcy on the advice of his attorney.  In evaluating whether
188 See id.; Tribble, supra note 185, at 795.
189 See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
190 Tribble, supra note 185, at 796.
191 The 1984 Amendment included no definitional guidance as to how the notion of
“substantial abuse” was to be understood.
192 Tribble, supra note 185, at 797.
193 In Kornfield v. Schwartz, 164 F.3d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit reiterated
that “the debtor’s personal circumstances are relevant to . . . ability to pay.” However, in no
case did a debtor’s ability to pay, standing alone, mandate dismissal. Id.
194 Under the “substantial abuse” analysis, judges were free to consider varying other
factors, including:
(1)“[w]hether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden
illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) [w]hether the debtor
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of
his ability to repay; (3) [w]hether the debtor’s proposed family budget
[was] excessive or unreasonable; (4) [w]hether the debtor’s schedules
and statement of current income and expenses reasonably and accurately
reflect[ed] the true financial condition; and (5) [w]hether the petition was
filed in good faith.
Green v. Staples, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). See also
Price v. United States Trustee, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering the five
factors in Green as well as “[w]hether the debtor has engaged in eve-of-bankruptcy purchases”);
In re Snow, 185 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (noting that Green and similar cases
“may be collectively summarized as requiring an analysis of the facts and circumstances of
the individual case”).
195 Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 756 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Milavetz v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 798–99) (8th Cir. 2008)).
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this additional debt was made “with the intent to abuse the protections of the bank-
ruptcy system” such that the narrow-form Gag Rule would apply to Attorney’s advice,
a bankruptcy judge would employ the proposed analysis to look beyond the Debtor’s
financial reports to account for a variety of surrounding and circumstantial factors.196
The court in In re Renner197 addressed a situation similar to that of our hypothetical
Debtor. The court’s determination that the granting of relief under Chapter 7 to the
debtors would not constitute “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy system was based
in part upon its finding that the debtors’ financial situation “appear[ed] to be the result
not of irresponsible consumer spending but of unfortunate health problems.”198  The
court explained that the debtors’ affidavit indicated that one of the debtors suffered
from increasingly aggravated multiple sclerosis, and that her uninsured medical ex-
penses could be anticipated to increase.199  In addition, the other debtor had suffered
a heart attack, which resulted in a reduction in his employability.200  Although their
financial condition, at the time of filing, may have supported a successful Chapter 13
plan, the court exercised its discretion to find that the filing was not abusive given the
medical needs of both debtors.201
Similarly, in our hypothetical, a bankruptcy judge using the proposed analysis
would transpose the multi-factor “substantial abuse” evaluation onto the attorney
speech at issue.  In so doing, he or she would look beyond the fact that the additional
unsecured debt had caused Debtor to fail the means test.  The judge may discover that
the unsecured loan was advised not “with an intent to abuse the protections of the bank-
ruptcy system,” but rather in the interest of Debtor’s financial and physical health.202 
In such a case, the court’s finding would successfully rebut the presumption of appli-
cability resulting from step one and thereby protect the attorney’s speech from appli-
cation of the Gag Rule in its new and narrow form.
Under the FJA’s “substantial abuse” standard, “[p]ersonal circumstances could
also weigh in favor of dismissal of a [debtor’s] Chapter 7 petition.”203  For instance,
in First USA v. Lamanna, the First Circuit held that despite his very low income, the
debtor could not file for relief as a liquidating consumer.204  Because Lamanna was
living with his parents at the time he filed for bankruptcy, his expenses were low
enough to suggest an increased ability to pay.205  Similarly, a court employing the pro-
posed analysis to our hypothetical might reasonably conclude that Debtor’s unsecured
196 See supra note 184 & accompanying text.
197 70 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
198 Id. at 29.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 28.
201 Id. at 29.
202 See supra note 184 & accompanying text (explaining that judges may find non-abuse
by looking to other factors).
203 Tribble, supra note 185, at 797.
204 153 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998).
205 Id.
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medical loan was unnecessary in light of his substantial insurance coverage or dis-
ability benefit entitlements.  Should that position prevail, the second step of the pro-
posed analysis would buttress the presumption from the first, resulting in a finding
that the narrow-form Gag Rule should apply to Attorney’s advice to Debtor regarding
the additional borrowed sum.
CONCLUSION
This Note first suggests that courts should apply a narrow form of Bankruptcy
Code section 526(a)(4).  The narrow form is achieved when courts interpret the phrase
“in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean “with the intent to abuse the protections
of the bankruptcy system.”206  In effect, this interpretation subjects only speech that
is unprotected by the First Amendment to restriction under the Gag Rule.
Next, this Note proposes a two-pronged analysis designed to assist courts in
identifying the speech to which the narrowed Gag Rule should properly apply.  By
targeting restrictable speech with precision, the suggested framework vindicates Judge
Colloton’s reasoning and that of the courts in Conant v. Walters and Hersh v. United
States.  Importantly, the proposed framework limits the Gag Rule’s application to
speech that Congress regarded as dangerous to the bankruptcy system and intended
to prohibit in passing the BAPCPA.
In considering the results of the means test at the outset, the first prong of the pro-
posed framework serves the intent of Congress in enacting the BAPCPA by establish-
ing a rebuttable presumption based upon the notion of causation.  Speech leading to a
passage of the means test that would otherwise not exist is presumed to be subject to the
narrowed Gag Rule and restriction that withstands scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Further, in attending to the circumstances of each particular debtor, the second
prong of the proposed analysis gives effect to the original tenets of the Bankruptcy
Code and ameliorates some of the BAPCPA’s harsh and disfavored effects.  By
allowing courts to consider factors beyond a debtor’s ability to repay, the proposed
analysis returns a modicum of judicial discretion to bankruptcy courts and softens
the edges of the rigid means test for debtors who need it most.
Appropriate interpretation and application of the Gag Rule demands a strong
judicial commitment to the freedom of debtors and their attorneys to openly commu-
nicate.  Through a reasoned and cogent analytical process, the suggested framework
aligns the realities of the bankruptcy system with the precepts of the First Amendment. 
While preserving speech given life and protection by the Constitution, the framework
advances the spirit of American bankruptcy law by affording straightforward advice
to deserving debtors along with the chance for a financial “fresh start.”207
206 See supra note 178 & accompanying text.
207 The oft-cited “fresh start” principle of the Bankruptcy Code was early recognized by
the Supreme Court in Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
